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#BANKRUPTCY: RECONSIDERING “PROPERTY” TO 
DETERMINE THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE 
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE 
ABSTRACT 
Social media has become increasingly necessary for staying connected in 
our globalized and tech-savvy society. Although social media has become a 
staple of modern life and a regular part of business, the legal definition of 
social media remains undefined. 
State legislatures have remained silent on the topic, but as business and 
individual account holders find themselves seeking bankruptcy relief, it 
becomes clear that treatment under the Bankruptcy Code depends on 
definitions that do not yet exist. The question of how social media should be 
characterized leaves bankruptcy courts uncertain as to whether social media 
accounts should be included in the bankruptcy estate. 
While social media encompasses aspects of property, intellectual property, 
and other rights, this Comment argues that social media does not fit solely into 
any of these categories. Instead, this Comment argues for the classification of 
a social media account as more similar to a personal privilege than a 
traditional property right. This Comment concludes that state legislatures 
should legally define social media to foster predictability of its role in 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
INTRODUCTION 
The explosion of social media has become undeniably evident in recent 
years. Sixty-four percent of social media users use social media services, such 
as Facebook and Twitter, at least once a day.1 As of 2014, Facebook had 132 
million unique visitors each month, Twitter had 32 million, and Pinterest had 
27 million.2 Each of these services also received millions of visitors each 
month to their respective mobile applications.3 
 
 1 The U.S. Digital Consumer Report, NIELSEN 16 (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.nielsen.com/content/ 
corporate/us/en/insights/reports/2014/the-us-digital-consumer-report.html. 
 2 Id. at 18.  
 3 See id. 
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The impact of social media extends beyond how many people “like,”4 
“favorite,”5 or “retweet.”6 For example, a new law in California, nicknamed 
the “Eraser Bill,” requires that by January 1, 2015, all websites on which a 
California minor is registered, including social media services, must include a 
function to delete content minors previously posted.7 From a business 
perspective, social users have generated lucrative returns. For example, 
retailers have seen their marketing efforts on social media services result in 
higher sales.8 Facebook and Twitter both filed for initial public offerings 
within a year of one another, revealing revenues over $3 billion9 and $300 
million,10 respectively. 
Celebrities, in particular, are highly visible on social media by using 
accounts across multiple services. Even individuals with no prior fame have 
gained hundreds of thousands of followers and subscribers through their 
unique online personalities.11 Besides popularity, these online celebrities have 
capitalized on their social-media followings to create new income streams.12 
It is uncertain whether this social media presence would be a property 
interest included in the bankruptcy estate if an online celebrity were to file for 
bankruptcy. This Comment argues that because a social media presence 
includes inherent liberty interests beyond the scope of property, an individual’s 
 
 4 Posts on Facebook are followed by a “like” button, which allows other users to show their support for 
the post. Like, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/452446998120360/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). 
 5 The “favorite” feature is the Twitter-equivalent of the Facebook like button. Favoriting a Tweet, 
TWITTER HELP CENTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169874-favoriting-a-tweet (last visited Jan. 9, 
2015).  
 6 Posts on Twitter may also be “retweeted”, which allows users to share a tweet originally posted by 
another user. FAQs About Retweets (RT), TWITTER HELP CENTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/77606-
faqs-about-retweets-rt (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). 
 7 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22581 (2014). 
 8 See Joel Schectman, Social Media Finally Delivering on Promise of Higher Sales, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
24, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/09/24/social-media-finally-delivering-on-promise-of-higher-sales 
(describing how social media services have begun offering retailers digital tools to target relevant consumer 
demographics). 
 9 Facebook Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 9 (Feb. 1, 2012). 
 10 Twitter, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 2 (Oct. 3, 2013). 
 11 E.g., Amy O’Leary, The Woman with 1 Billion Clicks, Jenna Marbles, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/fashion/jenna-marbles.html (noting that Ms. Marbles has more than one 
billion views and eight million subscribers on YouTube). 
 12 E.g., Rachel Quigley, YouTube Star Who Rose to Fame After Hilarious Drunk Makeup Tutorial Now 
Has More Than One Billion Hits and 8.2 Million Subscribers, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www. 
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2308780/Jenna-Marbles-YouTube-star-rose-fame-hilarious-drunk-makeup-
tutorial-billion-hits-8-2-million-subscribers.html (estimating that Ms. Marbles may have earned $346,827 in 
2012 from advertising revenues). 
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social media account cannot be assigned a value. Therefore, the social media 
presence should be excluded from the bankruptcy estate. 
Part I of this Comment provides the framework for understanding social 
media and the treatment of property under the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”). 
Part II is divided into three subparts. Part II.A conceptualizes social media as 
an extension of the user’s identity and explains how social media accounts 
contain some of the characteristics of a traditional property interest. Part II.B 
analyzes the social media service’s terms of service to determine who owns the 
content posted by the user. Lastly, Part II.C considers existing law and how it 
can be analogized and applied to social media. This Comment concludes that 
social media accounts should not be included in the bankruptcy estate. Further, 
legislatures should define what elements of a social media account qualify as 
property under the Code. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. What Is Social Media? 
Social media has been defined as “websites and applications which enable 
users to create and share content or to participate in social networking.”13 
Social media has been divided into six categories:14 collaborative projects,15 
blogs and microblogs,16 content communities,17 social networking websites,18 
virtual game-worlds,19 and virtual social worlds.20 This Comment will focus 
primarily on blogs and microblogs, content communities, and social 
networking websites, although much of the argument applies to other forms of 
social media as well. 
A social media post may contain words, pictures, videos, or any 
combination thereof, created by the user or someone else and shared by the 
 
 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/183739?redirected 
From=social+media (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
 14 Andreas M. Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite! The Challenges and 
Opportunities of Social Media, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 59, 62–64 (2010). 
 15 E.g., WIKIPEDIA, http://www.wikipedia.org (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). 
 16 E.g., TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). 
 17 E.g., YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). 
 18 E.g., FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); TWITTER, http://www.twitter. 
com (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). 
 19 E.g., WORLD OF WARCRAFT, http://us.battle.net/wow (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). 
 20 E.g., SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). 
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user.21 These types of content are all subject to applicable copyright law.22 The 
value of a social media user’s posts is not only related to the content itself, but 
also to who is posting the content. 
B. What Is Property Under the Bankruptcy Code? 
Famed legal scholar Dean William Prosser once wrote, “It seems quite 
pointless to dispute over whether such a right is to be classified as property.”23 
The statement is an understanding of the difficulty in accurately defining what 
is “property,” and an acceptance that property is perhaps more of an elusive 
concept than a concrete category. Nonetheless, the need to determine what 
exactly constitutes property remains important in the bankruptcy context. 
Upon filing of a bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy estate is created 
pursuant to § 541 of the Code.24 The bankruptcy estate is a new legal entity, 
separate and distinct from the debtor.25 Thus, when property is included in the 
estate, the trustee has control over the property, including the authority to use 
and sell it for the benefit of creditors.26 In essence, the ownership rights of the 
property transfer from the debtor to the bankruptcy estate. 
Section 541 defines property of the bankruptcy estate as “all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
case.”27 While § 541 defines which of the debtor’s interests are included in the 
estate, it does not address the threshold question of what constitutes the 
debtor’s legal or equitable interests in a particular type of property. The 
Supreme Court of the United States clarified this omission by stating, 
“Property interests are created and defined by state law,” and these state law 
definitions apply in bankruptcy proceedings.28 
 
 21 See Toni Ahlqvist et al., Social Media Roadmaps: Exploring the Futures Triggered by Social Media, 
VTT TECHNICAL RES. CENTRE FIN. 13 (Nov. 2008), http://www.vtt.fi/inf/pdf/tiedotteet/2008/T2454.pdf. 
 22 The Copyright Act of 1976 extends copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression,” with works of authorship including categories such as literary, musical, 
pictorial, graphic, and audiovisual works. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 23 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 406 (1960). 
 24 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012). 
 25 See id.; In re Dow Corning Corp., 270 B.R. 393, 398–99 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2001) (citing Frank v. 
Mich. State Unemployment Agency (In re Thompson Boat Co.), 252 F.3d 852, 854 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
 26 11 U.S.C. § 704(a).  
 27 Id. § 541(a)(1). 
 28 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).  
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Section 541 has been interpreted to include both tangible and intangible 
property interests.29 Intellectual property is “a category of intangible rights 
protecting commercially valuable products of the human intellect and 
comprising primarily trademark, copyright and patent rights.”30 Case law has 
recognized goodwill as an intellectual property interest eligible for inclusion in 
the bankruptcy estate.31 
Section 554 permits the trustee to abandon property of the estate that is 
either a burden or of inconsequential value or benefit.32 It also permits the 
court to order the trustee to abandon property on request of a party of interest.33 
This abandoned property then vests in the debtor.34 
A major dispute in bankruptcy cases involving property of the estate is the 
inclusion of future profits or proceeds, sometimes referred to as 
“expectancies.”35 One consideration of these expectancies is that they hold “a 
very valuable legal right that is of no value to anyone but the debtor.”36 This 
characterization is analogous to the reason that social media accounts should 
not be treated as property because, while they may be valuable, that value is 
created by and inherent to the user. 
II. PROOF OF CLAIM 
A. Social Media as a Pseudo-Property Interest 
The personal nature of social media supports this Comment’s argument that 
one’s social media account should not be treated as property within a 
bankruptcy proceeding. The first question to consider is who actually owns the 
content: the user or the social media service? One example raises questions 
about the ownership and alienability of a user’s social media account. In 2008, 
 
 29 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.03[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010). 
 30 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (9th ed. 2009). 
 31 See In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1996); FitzSimmons v. Walsh (In re FitzSimmons), 725 F.2d 
1208 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 32 11 U.S.C. § 554(a). 
 33 Id. § 554(b). 
 34 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, at ¶ 554.02[3]; see In re McGowan, 95 B.R. 104, 106 
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988). 
 35 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, at ¶ 541.02 (“The status of property acquired by an 
individual following the filing of the bankruptcy case is not always clear.”); see Parks v. Dittmar (In re 
Dittmar), 618 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 36 ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 121 (6th 
ed. 2009) (emphasis added).  
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B.J. Mendelson created an account on Twitter for a cross-country breast cancer 
awareness tour he was planning with the 1 in 8 Foundation.37 He became the 
first non-celebrity, non-brand, non-media outlet to be placed on Twitter’s 
Suggested User List, which appears on users’ profile pages to suggest popular 
accounts to follow.38 An entrepreneur was offering to purchase from Twitter a 
two-year placement on the Suggested User List.39 Mendelson heard about this 
offer and offered to sell his spot on the Suggested User List for $250,000, 
which would be donated to the 1 in 8 Foundation.40 Twitter prevented the 
sale.41 
While users are not able to sell their accounts, in some cases they may 
share control over their social media accounts. Since 2012, the Twitter account 
@MichelleObama has been managed by staff members of the President Obama 
2012 presidential campaign with First Lady Michelle Obama’s own tweets 
signed “-mo.”42 In 2013, the Twitter account @FLOTUS was started by the 
Office of the First Lady, once again with First Lady Michelle Obama’s own 
tweets signed “-mo.”43 Each account features Michelle Obama’s likeness in the 
profile picture and both have tweets written by her.44 The similarity of the 
accounts and the shared control makes ownership of the accounts unclear. 
1. The Nature of Fame and the Right of Publicity 
The nature of social media accounts makes it difficult to determine the 
delineation between the individual and the individual’s expression. Other types 
of personal property are physically distinct from their creator. But because 
social media involves the continued posting by the account holder, the user has 
a continued connection with the account. There is a source of identity and fame 
 
 37 Humberto Martínez, An Unlikely Twitter Star, TIMES UNION (Aug. 28, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://www. 
timesunion.com/entertainment/article/An-unlikely-Twitter-star-556883.php. 
 38 See id. 
 39 Erick Schonfeld, How Much Is a Suggested Slot on Twitter Worth? Jason Calacanis Offers $250,000, 
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 12, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/03/12/how-much-is-a-suggested-slot-on-twitter-
worth-jason-calacanis-offers-250000. 
 40 Michael Arrington, Hey Twitter, Here’s a Way to Call Jason’s Bluff and Maybe Fight Breast Cancer, 
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 20, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/03/20/hey-twitter-heres-a-way-to-call-jasons-bluff-
and-maybe-fight-breast-cancer. 
 41 See B.J. Mendelson, About B.J. Mendelson, B.J. MENDELSON – THE MARK TWAIN OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://bjmendelson.com/2013/08/29/about-brandon-mendelson. 
 42 Michelle Obama (@MichelleObama), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/michelleobama (last visited Jan. 9, 
2015, 5:12 PM). 
 43 The First Lady (@FLOTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/flotus (last visited Jan. 9, 2015, 5:12 PM). 
 44 Compare Michelle Obama (@MichelleObama), supra note 42, with The First Lady (@FLOTUS), 
supra note 43. 
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attached to popular social media accounts.45 People interact with these 
accounts because they identify the account with the person or company 
controlling it.46 
The right of publicity is the right to control the commercial use of one’s 
name or likeness.47 Though the right of publicity has been treated as having 
foundations in property law,48 it remains a somewhat amorphous concept. 
About half the states have recognized that there is commercial value in the 
identity of a celebrity.49 State laws on this issue differ considerably in their 
recognition of publicity rights.50 Without a standardized definition of what is 
included in the right of publicity, choosing the applicable state law presents its 
own challenge. 
A celebrity’s right of publicity may become a “right of value” when the 
celebrity endorses a tangible product that would express the right of publicity 
“in certain things of value.”51 In other words, the right of publicity has no 
value until the name or image of the famous figure is attached to something 
tangible.52 Professors Jacoby and Zimmerman argue that fame has become a 
commodity, and therefore is subject to liquidation in a chapter 7 bankruptcy.53 
They also acknowledge the practical difficulty in that “the [right of publicity] 
may need to be disentangled from its residual overlay of personal rights.”54 
Unless the social media account itself is tied to a tangible and saleable product, 
there is no right of value in the account itself. 
Primary issues of the distinction between commercial and non-commercial 
social media posts include creating a standard that could be applied to 
determine commerciality, the amount of discretion given to a trustee in using 
such a standard, and the threat of judicial review. Consider the case of Ree 
 
 45 E.g., O’Leary, supra note 11 (stating that Ms. Marbles has more than one billion views and eight 
million subscribers on YouTube). 
 46 Cf. Michelle Garrett, Why Do People Read Blogs?, BRITMUMS (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.britmums. 
com/2012/01/why-do-people-read-blogs (listing an interest in connecting with the author as among the reasons 
why people read blogs). 
 47 See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 48 Id.  
 49 Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted 
Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1324 n.7 (2002).  
 50 Id. at 1332. 
 51 Timothy Terrell & Jane Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and 
Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1, 20 (1985). 
 52 See id. 
 53 Jacoby & Leenheer Zimmerman, supra note 49, at 1322–23. 
 54 Id. at 1323. 
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Drummond, who translated the success from her blog on homeschooling, 
cooking, and life on an Oklahoma ranch into advertising revenue estimated 
around $1,000,000,55 several best-selling cookbooks, a television show on 
Food Network, and movie rights to her memoir. While blog posts promoting 
products are commercial in nature, it is unclear whether, for example, a post 
merely consisting of two photographs of purple peppers Drummond grew in 
her own garden would be commercial. 
Second, the time to sort through more than seven years of blog posts,56 four 
years of Facebook posts,57 15,217 tweets,58 and 580 pins59 to determine which 
are commercial in nature, and therefore may invoke a publicity right, would be 
a daunting task. Additionally, the administrative costs incurred would also be 
significant. 
A third practical concern is the treatment of publicity rights within the 
bankruptcy system. Debtors are required to either liquidate their publicity 
rights or pay for the right to retain them.60 Both liquidation and purchasing the 
right to retain their account, and the right of publicity invested in it, would 
require a valuation of the account itself. While valuation would be difficult, it 
would not be impossible.61 An appraisal of the components of the social media 
account may include valuing advertising revenue, intellectual property, and 
goodwill.62 
 
 55 Anna Viele, How Much Do Bloggers Make? Case Study: Ree Drummond AKA The Pioneer Woman, 
ABDPBT, http://www.abdpbt.com/personalfinance/how-much-do-bloggers-make-case-study-ree-drummond-
aka-the-pioneer-woman (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). 
 56 See Ree Drummond, THE PIONEER WOMAN | REE DRUMMOND, http://thepioneerwoman.com (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2015); Ree Drummond, TASTY KITCHEN: A HAPPY RECIPE COMMUNITY, http://tastykitchen. 
com (last visited Jan. 10, 2015). 
 57 See Ree Drummond, The Pioneer Woman - Ree Drummond, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ 
thepioneerwoman?ref=ts (last visited Jan. 10, 2015). 
 58 See Ree Drummond, Ree Drummond (@thepioneerwoman), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ 
thepioneerwoman (last visited Jan. 10, 2015, 9:20 AM). 
 59 See Ree Drummond, Ree Drummond | The Pioneer Woman, PINTEREST, http://www.pinterest.com/ 
thepioneerwoman (last visited Jan. 10, 2015, 1:54 PM). Pinterest defines “pins” as “visual bookmarks.” Pins, 
PINTEREST, https://help.pinterest.com/en/guide/pins (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
 60 Jacoby & Leenheer Zimmerman, supra note 49, at 1327–28. 
 61 See John Biggs, A Dispute over Who Owns a Twitter Account Goes to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 
2011, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/technology/lawsuit-may-determine-who-owns-
a-twitter-account.html. 
 62 An application called Social Valuator has developed a proprietary algorithm to calculate the value of a 
Twitter account based on the number of followers, lists, and age of the account. Twitter Value, SOCIAL STATS, 
http://howmuchismytwitterworth.com (last visited Jan. 10, 2015). 
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A major policy concern is how liquidation of the social media account 
would affect one of the primary aims of the bankruptcy system—to create a 
fresh start for the debtor.63 Heather Armstrong, a self-proclaimed “professional 
blogger,” has earned her living from advertising revenue and selling products 
on her blog.64 If she were to file for bankruptcy, with her blog and other social 
media accounts included in the bankruptcy estate, she would have to recreate 
her online persona through new accounts and regain subscribers. This loss of 
control over her social media accounts and related persona would counteract a 
major goal of the bankruptcy system and deprive Armstrong of her future 
income stream and customer base from those accounts.65 
For an online personality such as Armstrong, treating her social media 
presence as a property interest to be included in the bankruptcy estate would be 
a deprivation of her livelihood. If a social media presence is recognized as a 
liberty interest, that is as an intangible interest outside the sphere of valuable 
property interests for distribution among creditors, then Fifth Amendment 
concerns of deprivation of liberty without due process would be implicated.66 
Additionally, depriving the debtor of a liberty interest would violate the 
purpose of the bankruptcy system. This deprivation would impinge on the 
debtor herself, thereby negating the policy of providing a fresh start. 
2. Taking a Step Back and Rethinking “Property” 
An alternate way of analyzing property is the central case model used by 
Professor Terrell.67 The central case model begins with the “most essential, 
irreducible elements” of the “focal meaning” of the paradigmatic example of 
property.68 The “focal meaning” is determined by how the term property is 
used in practice.69 The analysis then expands outward to determine just how far 
from the central case an interest can be before it is too peripheral to be 
 
 63 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“[Bankruptcy] gives to the honest but unfortunate 
debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of preexisting debt.”). The debtor’s fresh start and what constitutes property of the estate 
under § 541 are inherently related. See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966).  
 64 Heather Armstrong, About, DOOCE, http://dooce.com/about (last visited Jan 10, 2015). 
 65 But cf. Jones v. Jones (In re Jones), 43 B.R. 1002, 1005 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (“Inclusion of an asset in a 
bankruptcy estate is no longer determined by reference to the nature of the asset and how the asset relates to 
the debtor’s situation.”). 
 66 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 67 See Timothy P. Terrell, “Property,” “Due Process,” and the Distinction Between Definition and 
Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. L.J. 861 (1982). 
 68 Id. at 866. 
 69 See id. at 865–74. 
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considered property.70 The parameters of what is encompassed within property 
are established by identifying the commonly understood characteristics of 
property. Absent those characteristics, the given example is not property.71 
One application of the central case model reduces the essential 
characteristics of property to three rights (use, exclusion, and transfer) and 
three rules for violating these rights (punishment, damage, and liability).72 
Whether a social media account is property begins by determining whether the 
three rights are present. A social media user has the right to use his or her own 
account as long as he or she abides by the service’s terms of service.73 The 
exclusion right arguably exists in the form of the user controlling who can and 
cannot interact with their account.74 On the surface, the transfer right 
seemingly exists in the form of control over who has access to the account. 
An analysis of these terms of service shows that these social media services 
do not fit this definition of property. As Pinterest’s Terms of Service states, 
“[W]e grant you a limited, non-exclusive, non-transferable, and revocable 
license to use our Products.”75 The terms limited, non-exclusive, non-
transferable and revocable all suggest a user’s lack of total control or 
ownership over the account. The first three rights are not established here 
because the use is limited and can be revoked by Pinterest at any time, and 
exclusion and transferability are forbidden. On the other hand, the rules of 
punishment, damages, and liability for interference with these rights do exist. 
For example, Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities specifies 
 
 70 See id. 
 71 See id. 
 72 Id. at 868 n.23.  
 73 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2013), https://www.facebook.com/ 
legal/terms; Terms of Service, PINTEREST, http://about.pinterest.com/terms (last visited Jan. 10, 2015) 
[hereinafter Pinterest Terms of Service]; Terms of Service, TWITTER (Sept. 8, 2014), https://twitter.com/tos 
[hereinafter Twitter Terms of Service]; Terms of Service, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/ 
t/terms [hereinafter YouTube Terms of Service]. 
 74 For example, Twitter permits a user to block another user from interacting with his or her account. 
Blocking Users on Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/117063-blocking-users-on-twitter 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2015). 
 75 Pinterest Terms of Service, supra note 73; see also Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra 
note 73 (“[Y]ou grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use 
any IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook (IP License).”); Twitter Terms of Service, 
supra note 73 (“Twitter gives you a personal, worldwide, royalty-free, non-assignable and non-exclusive 
license to use the software that is provided to you by Twitter as part of the Services.”); YouTube Terms of 
Service, supra note 73 (“These Terms of Service, and any rights and licenses granted hereunder, may not be 
transferred or assigned by you . . . .”). 
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twelve forbidden actions necessary to protect the Facebook community.76 In 
summation, while it appears that these rights of property do not apply to social 
media services, his rules of property do. 
This creates a blurred dichotomy that suggests social media accounts are a 
pseudo-property interest possessing only some property characteristics. Since 
social media is a relatively new phenomenon, its social context is still 
changing. What is clear is that social media services allow their users some 
control over their accounts, but that control is not absolute. 
B. Ownership of Social Media 
A social media user owns his or her original posted content, subject to 
applicable intellectual property law77 and conditions imposed by the social 
media service.78 However, in posting the content, a license is created for the 
service to use and reproduce that same content.79 Because social media 
services’ terms of service expressly state that users have ownership over self-
generated content, it is possible that this content could be included in the 
bankruptcy estate. 
The implications of including user-generated content in the bankruptcy 
estate are multifold. Depending on the payment schedule of an advertiser who 
sponsors a social media user’s posts, not only could the posts be included in 
the estate, but also any prepetition and postpetition proceeds received as a 
 
 76 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 73. 
 77 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified in scattered sections 
of 17 U.S.C.). 
 78 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 73 (“You own all of the content and 
information you post on Facebook . . . .”); Pinterest Terms of Service, supra note 73 (“You retain all rights in, 
and are solely responsible for, the User Content you post to Pinterest.”); Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 
73 (“You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services.”); YouTube 
Terms of Service, supra note 73 (“For clarity, you retain all of your ownership rights in your Content.”). 
 79 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 73 (“[Y]ou grant us a non-exclusive, 
transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or in 
connection with Facebook (IP License).”); Pinterest Terms of Service, supra note 73 (“You grant Pinterest and 
its users a non-exclusive, royalty-free, transferable, sublicensable, worldwide license to use, store, display, 
reproduce, re-pin, modify, create derivative works, perform, and distribute your User Content. We reserve the 
right to remove or modify User Content for any reason . . . .”); Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 73 (“By 
submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, 
royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, 
transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods . . . .”); YouTube 
Terms of Service, supra note 73 (“[Y]ou hereby grant YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, 
sublicenseable and transferable license to use, reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and 
perform the Content . . . .”). 
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result of those posts.80 For example, another party, such as the social media 
company itself, might reproduce the debtor’s original content. This would 
result in additional content attributable to the user and of value to the estate. 
Presumably, the automatic stay provisions of the Code81 would negate the 
terms of service of a social media service that typically would allow for 
modification or removal of the content.82 While in effect, the automatic stay 
prohibits most attempts to reach the debtor’s assets, with violations resulting in 
damages.83 For example, assume a video that included a paid advertisement 
was uploaded to YouTube prepetition. Once the bankruptcy petition was filed, 
the video, as well as the revenue stream generated by the advertising would be 
included in the bankruptcy estate. In essence, the automatic stay would freeze 
any prepetition content posted by a debtor on a social media account, such that 
that the social media service could not modify or remove it during the 
bankruptcy case. 
1. Social Media, Intellectual Property, and Executory Contracts 
There are two main types of contractual relationships that commonly exist 
in social media among revenue-earning users. The first type, the “Terms of 
Service Contract” is created when the user agrees to the terms of service for a 
particular social media service.84 The result is a contract created between the 
user and the service.85 Arguably, agreeing to the Terms of Service Contract 
also transforms the user into a licensor by granting the social media service a 
non-exclusive license to content posted by the user.86 Simultaneously, the user 
 
 80 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2012) (“Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property 
of the estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the 
commencement of the case.”); id. § 541(a)(7) (“Such estate is compromised of all the following property 
[including] . . . [a]ny interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case.”). 
 81 Id. § 362. 
 82 See, e.g., Pinterest Terms of Service, supra note 73 (“We reserve the right to remove or modify User 
Content for any reason . . . .”). 
 83 11 U.S.C. § 362(k). 
 84 Typically, this occurs when users click an “I Agree” button when creating an account. 
 85 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 73 (“[T]his statement is an agreement 
between you and Facebook . . . .”); Pinterest Terms of Service, supra note 73 (“You may use our Products only 
if you can form a binding contract with Pinterest, and only in compliance with these Terms . . . .”); Twitter 
Terms of Service, supra note 73 (“You may use the Services only if you can form a binding contract with 
Twitter . . . .”). 
 86 See, e.g., Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 73 ([Y]ou grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-
free license . . . .”). Similar language is present in the terms of service of each social media service discussed in 
this Comment. For example, Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities specifically refers to its 
license as the “IP license,” and also states, “This IP License ends when you delete your IP content or your 
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becomes a licensee of the social media service, which grants the user a non-
exclusive license to use the service.87 The second type of contractual 
relationship, the “Advertising Contract,” is the contract created between the 
user and an advertiser who sponsors or pays for posts by the user.88 
The Terms of Service Contract is more complex because of the dual 
ongoing intellectual property licenses. The user grants the social media service 
rights to the user’s posts. Those posts, which are original works of authorship 
fixed within a tangible medium, are eligible for copyright protection under the 
Copyright Act.89 In exchange, the social media service grants the user rights to 
use its original software and website to post the content.90 
Intellectual property laws generally require that an intellectual property 
licensing agreement be treated as a “personal” contract, thereby precluding 
performance by a non-party to the original licensing agreement, unless the 
licensor consents to such performance.91 This is because non-exclusive 
intellectual property licenses do not transfer any ownership interest in the 
intellectual property from the licensor to the licensee, but rather only grant 
permission for use of the intellectual property.92 This permission for use is 
considered a personal right, not a property right.93 As a result, a licensee 
generally is not allowed to assign its rights under the intellectual property 
 
account unless your content has been shared with others, and they have not deleted it.” Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities, supra note 73. 
 87 See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE+ (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/ 
terms (“Google gives you a personal, worldwide, royalty-free, non-assignable and non-exclusive license to use 
the software provided to you by Google as part of the Services.”); Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 73 
(“Twitter gives you a personal, worldwide, royalty-free, non-assignable and non-exclusive license to use the 
software that is provided to you by Twitter as part of the Services.”). 
 88 See MATTHEW S. EASTIN, HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON DIGITAL MEDIA AND ADVERTISING: USER 
GENERATED CONTENT CONSUMPTION 248–61 (Terry Daugherty & Neal M. Burns eds., 2010). 
 89 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).  
 90 See Google Terms of Service, supra note 88 (“Google gives you a personal, worldwide, royalty-free, 
non-assignable and non-exclusive license to use the software provided to you by Google as part of the 
Services.”); Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 73 (“Twitter gives you a personal, worldwide, royalty-free, 
non-assignable and non-exclusive license to use the software that is provided to you by Twitter as part of the 
Services.”). 
 91 Peter M. Gilhuly, Kimberly A. Posin & Ted A. Dillman, Intellectually Bankrupt?: The Comprehensive 
Guide to Navigating IP Issues in Chapter 11, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013). 
 92 Madlyn G. Primoff & Eric G. Weinberger, E-Commerce and Dot-Com Bankruptcies: Assumption, 
Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts, Including Intellectual Property Agreements and Related 
Issues Under Sections 365(c), 365(e) and 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307, 
317 (2000). 
 93 Gilhuly et al., supra note 92, at 6. 
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license without the licensor’s express permission.94 Moreover, the licensor is 
allowed to refuse performance from any party other than the original 
licensee.95 Here, the social media service, as licensor, may refuse performance 
from anyone other than the original registered user of the account. Thus, a 
court’s determination that an intellectual property license is a personal license 
may impair the debtor’s assignment of licensed intellectual property.96 
Executory contracts are contracts in which there is outstanding 
performance due by each contracting party.97 Section 365 of the Code gives the 
trustee the ability to assume, assign, or reject any executory contract, subject to 
court approval.98 This power enables the trustee to assume, or accept, contracts 
that are beneficial to reorganization, while allowing the trustee to reject those 
contracts that are not.99 When the trustee rejects a licensor’s intellectual 
property license, the licensor has the option to treat the rejection as a breach of 
contract or termination of the intellectual property license and can then assert a 
claim for damages.100 
Although the Code provides the non-debtor licensee with a right to bring a 
claim against the debtor-licensor, § 365(n) explicitly protects a licensee’s 
rights “to such intellectual property . . . as such rights existed immediately 
before the case commenced.”101 This language strongly suggests that § 365(n) 
does not protect a licensee’s interest in future intellectual property created after 
the case commenced because this interest does not vest until that intellectual 
property is created.102 As a licensee under the Terms of Service Contract, a 
social media service’s rights to content do not vest until the user has created 
the content. If the content is created postpetition, then the licensee’s rights to it 
are not protected under § 365(n). 
Ongoing intellectual property contracts are typically considered executory 
contracts.103 Following this, the Terms of Service Contract and the Advertising 
Contract are executory contracts. These executory contracts are subject to 
 
 94 See id. at 11. 
 95 Id. at 12. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Tonry v. Hebert (In re Tonry), 724 F.2d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1984); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra 
note 29, at ¶ 365.02 n.3. 
 98 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012).  
 99 Id. 
 100 See id. § 365(n).  
 101 Id. § 365(n)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
 102 Gilhuly et al., supra note 92, at 39. 
 103 See id. at 2 (citing In re Kmart Corp., 290 B.R. 614, 618 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003)).  
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section § 365(n), which lists the trustee’s options in regards to executory 
contracts when the debtor is a licensor to intellectual property. The trustee may 
choose to reject or accept the contract, and must follow certain provisions if 
the social media service, as licensee, elects to retain its rights in the licensing 
agreement with the user.104 
2. Effects of Filing for Bankruptcy on Social Media 
The ramifications of a trustee assuming control of a social media account 
and having the power to accept or reject contracts under § 365 extend beyond 
the trustee’s treatment of the debtor’s licensing agreement with a social media 
service. First, a trustee must accept or reject contracts with advertisers who 
sponsor posts and provide revenue for the user.105 Because rejection of an 
executory contract is treated as a contract breach, the advertiser, as the non-
debtor party, would have a claim for breach of contract against the debtor.106 
This claim for damages would be treated as a prepetition unsecured claim, 
making the advertiser an unsecured creditor under § 502(g).107 Such prepetition 
unsecured claims have relatively low priority in the bankruptcy system108 and 
are unlikely to be paid in full,109 the result of which may have a chilling effect 
on social media marketing and advertising campaigns. 
A second consequence of the Terms of Service contract is the possibility of 
a preference action. Section 547 of the Code provides the trustee with the 
power to avoid any transfer of a property interest of the debtor made while the 
debtor was insolvent, or made on or within ninety days before the filing of the 
petition.110 As argued above, a social media user agreeing to the Terms of 
Service is equivalent to the user granting the social media service a license. If 
the granting of that license was made while the debtor was insolvent, or within 
ninety days prior to the bankruptcy filing, the granting of that license may be a 
transfer subject to an avoidance action under § 547.111 
Third, the value of social media posts lie in their origin from the user. If 
control of an account were transferred to another entity, the value of the 
 
 104 11 U.S.C. § 365(n). 
 105 Id.  
 106 See id.  
 107 Id. § 502(g).  
 108 Id. § 507(a)(3). 
 109 Gilhuly et al., supra note 92, at 36. 
 110 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A). 
 111 Gilhuly et al., supra note 92, at n.5.  
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account would likely decline. Without the user creating value through his or 
her association with the account, the trustee may deem the account worthless 
and abandon it under § 554. Similarly, even shared control between the user 
and trustee may decrease the account’s value because of uncertainty regarding 
who is creating the posts. 
It remains to be seen how the social media world would react to 
interference by trustees or bankruptcy courts with a user’s social media 
account. The repercussions will be unpredictable without a uniform standard 
for the treatment of social media accounts in bankruptcy. 
C. Applying Old Law to New Technology 
Without a clear definition of social media in bankruptcy, another approach 
is to analyze how nonbankruptcy law treats interests that are similar to social 
media accounts. 
1. Nonbankruptcy Law and Website URLs 
While courts have not yet addressed whether social media constitutes a 
property right to be included in the bankruptcy estate, the Virginia Supreme 
Court has encountered the similar question of whether a website domain name 
constitutes a property interest subject to garnishment in a state law collection 
action.112 In Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro International, Inc., the court 
determined that the debtor had a contractual right to a domain name and this 
right was the product of a contract for services, and therefore not subject to 
garnishment.113 The domain name itself was held to be an intangible asset 
consisting of the rights delineated in the contract.114 The registrant and holder 
of the domain name had no separate intellectual property rights in the domain 
name itself.115 The court reasoned that domain names like telephone numbers 
are unique.116 
This comparison can be extended to social media accounts. Like domain 
names and telephone numbers, social media accounts are unique. A social 
media user’s page comes with its own unique webpage uniform resource 
locator (“URL”) and, in many cases, its own identifiable name as well. If, as 
 
 112 Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000). 
 113 Id. at 81.  
 114 Id. 
 115 See id. at 86. 
 116 Id. at 82–83. 
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the Virginia Supreme Court held, domain names are nonpossessory interests in 
intangible property, then URLs, identifiable names, and social media accounts 
are also nonpossessory interests in intangible property under nonbankruptcy 
law. Since the status of property in bankruptcy is determined by applicable 
state nonbankruptcy law,117 state law may determine URLs, identifiable names, 
and social media accounts to be nonpossessory interests in intangible property 
and not eligible for inclusion in the bankruptcy estate. 
2. Nonbankruptcy Law and Trademarks 
Trademarks are another legal interest to which a social media account can 
be analogized. Trademarks are federally protected under the Lanham Act118 
and state unfair competition statutes. A trademark is any word, name, symbol, 
device, or any combination thereof used in commerce to identify and 
distinguish one person’s goods from the goods of another person.119 A 
trademark cannot be sold or assigned “in gross,” meaning sold or assigned 
without including the goodwill that the trademark symbolizes.120 
By analogy, this assignability requirement may be applied to a social media 
username. A username identifies and distinguishes the source of the content of 
one user from another with the commercial aspect derived from the value 
associated with the account. A social media account is “in gross” when it is 
unattached from the goodwill created by and inherent to the user who created 
the content. The account would be unattached from this goodwill if the debtor 
no longer exercised control over the account because of its inclusion in the 
bankruptcy estate. Such an assignment would violate the restriction on 
assigning a trademark in gross. 
The policy of trademark law is to promote competition and protect 
consumers.121 In support of this policy, the Federal Trade Commission revised 
 
 117 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). 
 118 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2012). 
 119 See id. § 1127.  
 120 Id. § 1060(a)(1) (“A registered mark or a mark for which an application to register has been filed shall 
be assignable with the good will of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part of the good will of 
the business connected with the use of . . . the mark.”); see Ph. Schneider Brewing Co. v. Century Distilling 
Co., 107 F.2d 699, 703 (10th Cir. 1939) (“It may be stated as a general rule that a trade-mark may not be 
assigned in gross. It cannot be assigned separate and apart from the good will with which it is associated.”). 
 121 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 (2003) (“The Lanham Act was 
intended to make actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks, and to protect persons engaged in . . . 
commerce against unfair competition.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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its online advertising disclosure guidelines in March 2013.122 These guidelines 
protect consumers by requiring social media accounts to be accountable to 
their followers and subscribers. The guidelines require disclosures of 
sponsored posts to be “clear and conspicuous,”123 such as using the word “ad” 
in a sponsored tweet.124 For example, a tweet reading “@TwitterUser: Loving 
my new X Brand shoes! #ad”125 furthers trademark policy by indicating the 
origin of the tweet from @TwitterUser and that the tweet is a paid 
endorsement from X Brand. 
Assume now that @TwitterUser were to file for bankruptcy and the trustee 
were to include @TwitterUser’s account in the bankruptcy estate. Assume that 
the trustee would now have control over the @TwitterUser account with no 
interference or objections raised by Twitter, and that the trustee assumed 
@TwitterUser’s contract with X Brand for sponsored posts. If the trustee were 
to use his or her authority under the Code to maintain the debtor’s property,126 
the trustee could tweet from @TwitterUser’s account. However, the trustee 
would have no incentive to tweet the general, non-commercial posts that 
@TwitterUser previously posted to attract followers. 
The trustee would likely only post tweets that would generate revenue for 
the estate. This would have two effects. First, only posting sponsored tweets 
would likely alienate followers to the account. This would reduce followers 
and affect the value of the account and its attractiveness to advertisers. Second, 
the trustee’s control of the account would be deceptive to followers who 
associate the account with a particular user and not the trustee. This example 
illustrates how, even if all other hurdles to including a social media account in 
the estate were removed, allowing a trustee to have control of a debtor’s social 
media account would violate principles of trademark law and consumer 
protection. 
 
 122 Fed. Trade Comm’n, .Com Disclosures: How to Make Effective Disclosures in Digital Advertising, 
FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Mar. 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus41-dot-
com-disclosures-information-about-online-advertising.pdf. 
 123 Id. at 6. 
 124 Id. at A-18. 
 125 The # symbol is used to create a “hashtag,” which is placed before a keyword or phrase in a tweet to 
categorize it. The hashtag can be clicked on to view all other tweets that include the same hashtagged keyword 
or phrase. Using Hashtags on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CENTER, http://support.twitter.com/articles/49309-using-
hashtags-on-twitter (last visited Jan. 13, 2015). 
 126 See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
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CONCLUSION 
With the increasing ubiquity of social media, the question of its treatment 
in bankruptcy is inevitable. While social media accounts may be assigned 
value, the ambiguity of ownership of the accounts, the right of publicity, and 
practical concerns all suggest that social media accounts should not be 
included in the bankruptcy estate. By analogizing a social media account to a 
license or a trademark, it is clear that presence on a social media service is 
more akin to a personal privilege than a property right. As a personal privilege, 
the social media account is worthless when disassociated from the user who 
created the goodwill of the account. 
The time has come for the legislature to recognize that an interest in a 
social media account should not be alienable or transmissible because it is not 
property in the traditional sense. The inherent liberty interests of a social media 
presence extend far beyond the scope of property. The need for a legal 
definition of social media is imperative to guide lawyers and courts when 
issues surrounding social media inevitably arise in bankruptcy. 
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